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Abstract
Ranking models are typically designed to provide rankings that optimize some
measure of immediate utility to the users. As a result, they have been unable to
anticipate an increasing number of undesirable long-term consequences of their
proposed rankings, from fueling the spread of misinformation and increasing
polarization to degrading social discourse. Can we design ranking models that
understand the consequences of their proposed rankings and, more importantly,
are able to avoid the undesirable ones? In this paper, we first introduce a joint
representation of rankings and user dynamics using Markov decision processes.
Then, we show that this representation greatly simplifies the construction of con-
sequential ranking models that trade off the immediate utility and the long-term
welfare. In particular, we can obtain optimal consequential rankings just by ap-
plying weighted sampling on the rankings provided by models that maximize
measures of immediate utility. However, in practice, such a strategy may be ineffi-
cient and impractical, specially in high dimensional scenarios. To overcome this,
we introduce an efficient gradient-based algorithm to learn parameterized conse-
quential ranking models that effectively approximate optimal ones. We showcase
our methodology using synthetic and real data gathered from Reddit and show that
ranking models derived using our methodology provide ranks that may mitigate
the spread of misinformation and improve the civility of online discussions.
1 Introduction
Rankings are ubiquitous across a large variety of online services, from search engines, online shops
and recommender systems to social media and online dating. Consequently, it has become much
easier to find information, products, jobs, opinions or even potential romantic partners—rankings have
undoubtedly increased the utility users obtain from online services. However, ranking have also been
blamed to play a major role in an increasing number of missteps, particularly in the context of social
and information systems, from fueling the spread of misinformation [41], increasing polarization [13]
and degrading social discourse [44] to undermining democracy [40]. As the decisions taken by
ranking models become more consequential to individuals and society, one must ask: what went
wrong in these cases?
Current ranking models are typically designed to optimize immediate measures of utility, which
often reward instant gratification. For example, one of the guiding technical principles behind
the optimization of ranking models in the information retrieval literature, the Probability Ranking
Principle (PRP) [30], states that the optimal ranking should order items in terms of probability of
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relevance to the user. However, such measures of immediate utility do not account for long-term
consequences. As a result, ranking models often have an unexpected cost to the long-term welfare.
In this work, our goal is to design consequential ranking models which understand the long-term
consequences of their proposed rankings.
More specifically, we focus on a problem setting that fits a variety of real-world applications, including
those mentioned previously: at every time step, a ranking model receives a set of items and ranks
these items on the basis of a measure of immediate utility1 and a set of features. Items may appear
over time and be present at several time steps. Moreover, their corresponding features may change
over time and these changes may be due to the influence of previous rankings. For example, the
number of likes, votes, or comments—the features—that a post—the item—published by a user
receives in social media depends largely on its ranking position [12, 14, 17, 21]. Moreover, for every
sequence of rankings, there is an associated long-term (cost to the) welfare, whose specific definition
is application dependent. For example, in information integrity, the welfare may be defined as the
average number of posts including misinformation at the top of the rankings over time. Then, our
goal is to construct consequential ranking models that optimally trade off fidelity to the original
ranking model maximizing immediate utility and long-term welfare.
Our contributions. In this paper, we first introduce a joint representation of ranking models and user
dynamics using Markov decisions processes (MDPs), which is particularly well-fitted to faithfully
characterize the above problem setting2. Then, we show that this representation greatly simplifies
the construction of consequential ranking models that trade off fidelity to the rankings provided
by a model maximizing immediate utility and the long-term welfare. More specifically, we apply
Bellman’s principle of optimality and show that it is possible to derive an analytical expression for
the optimal consequential ranking model in terms of the original ranking model and the cost to the
welfare. This means that we can obtain optimal consequential rankings just by applying weighted
sampling on the rankings provided by the original ranking model using the (exponentiated) cost to
welfare. However, in practice, such a naive sampling will be inefficient, specially in the presence of
high-dimensional features. Therefore, we design a practical and efficient gradient-based algorithm to
learn parameterized consequential ranking models that effectively approximate optimal ones3.
Finally, we showcase our methodology using synthetic and real data gathered from Reddit. Our
results show that consequential ranking models derived using our methodology provide ranks that
may mitigate the spread of misinformation and improve the civility of online discussions without
significant deviations from the rankings provided by models maximizing immediate utility measures.
Further related work. The work most closely related to ours is devoted to construct either fair
rankings [1, 3, 5, 32–34, 45, 46] or diverse rankings [4, 7, 28, 29]. However, this line of research
defines fairness and diversity in terms of exposure allocation on an individual ranking. In contrast,
we consider sequences of rankings, we characterize the consequences of these rankings on the
user dynamics, and focus on improving the welfare in the long-term. Other related work includes
recent approaches to address the learning-to-rank problem from the perspective of reinforcement
learning [34, 11, 42]. However, these approaches consider the construction of a single optimal ranking
as an MDP in which the state defined at the level of an item/position. In contrast, our MDP considers
a sequence of rankings.
Finally, there is a paucity of work on the delayed impact of machine learning algorithms [15, 23, 25]
and recommender systems [35, 31]. However, the former has focused on classification tasks and
considered simple one-step feedback models and the latter on the tradeoff between exploration and
exploitation.
2 Rankings and User Dynamics
In this section, we first introduce our joint representation of rankings and user dynamics, starting
from the problem setting it is designed for. Then, we formally define consequential rankings as the
solution to a particular reinforcement learning problem.
1Our methodology does not need to observe the immediate utility the ranking model based their rankings on.
2In this work, for ease of exposition, we assume all users get exposed to the same rankings, as in, e.g., Reddit. However, our methodology
can be readily extended to the scenario in which each user get exposed to a different ranking, as in, e.g., Twitter.
3We will release an open-source implementation of our algorithm with the final version of the paper.
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Problem setting. Let pθ be a particular ranking model4 (or, equivalently, ranking algorithm). At
each time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the ranking model receives a set of n items and these items are
characterized by a feature matrixX(t) ∈ Rn×p, where the i-th rowXi(t) contains the feature values
for item i ∈ [n] and p is the number of features per item. Here, we assume that items may appear over
time and be present at several time steps. Moreover, their corresponding feature values may change
over time. For example, think of the number of likes, votes or comments that a post receives in social
media—they are often used as features to decide the ranking of the post and they change over time.
Then, the ranking model provides a ranking y(t) of the items on the basis of their set of features
and a (hidden) measure of immediate utility. A ranking y(t) = (y1(t), . . . , yn(t)) is defined as a
permutation of the n rank indices, i.e., the model ranks item i in position yi(t), where highest rank
is position 1. In addition, we also define the ordering ω(t) = (ω1(t), . . . , ωn(t)) of a ranking as a
permutation of the n item indices, i.e., the model ranks item ωi(t) in position i. The ranking and
orderings are related by wyi(t)(t) = i and ywi(t)(t) = i. Here, we assume that the provided ranking
at time step t may influence the feature matrix at time step t+ 1. This is in agreement with recent
empirical studies [12, 14, 17, 21], which have shown that the posts (the items) that are ranked highly
receive a higher number of likes, comments or shares (the features).
Finally, given a trajectory of feature matrices and rankings τ = {(X(t),y(t))}Tt=0 there is an additive
cost to the welfare, c(τ) =
∑T
t=0 c(X(t),y(t)), where c(X(t),y(t)) is an arbitrary immediate cost
whose specific definition is application dependent. For example, in information integrity, the welfare
may be defined as the average number of posts including misinformation at the top of the rankings
over time. In the remainder, we will say that a trajectory τ is induced by a ranking model pθ.
Joint representation of rankings and user dynamics. The above problem setting naturally fits
the following joint representation of rankings and user dynamics using Markov decision processes
(MDPs) [36], which also has an intuitive causal interpretation:
pθ(τ |X(t0),y(t0)) =
T∏
t=1
pθ(y(t) |X(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ranking model
p(X(t) |X(t− 1),y(t− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
user dynamics
, (1)
where the first term represents the particular choice of ranking model5, the second term represents
the distribution for the user dynamics, which determines the feature matrix at any given time step,
and the initial feature matrixX(t0) and ranking y(t0) are given. Moreover, the above representation
makes two major assumptions, which are also illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix A:
(i) To provide a ranking for a set of items at time step t, the ranking model only uses the feature
matrix corresponding to that set of items. More formally, given the feature matrix X(t), the
ranking y(t) provided by the ranking model is conditionally independent of previous feature
matricesX(t′), t′ < t. In most practical scenarios, ranking models optimizing for immediate
utility satisfy this assumption.
(ii) The dynamics of the feature matrices, which characterize the user dynamics, are Markovian.
That means, given the feature matrixX(t− 1) and ranking y(t− 1), the feature matrixX(t)
is conditionally independent of previous feature matrices X(t′) and rankings y(t′), t′ < t.
This is a natural assumption taken in the state-of-the-art models (e.g., Hawkes processes with
exponential kernels [8, 10, 37]).
— Ranking model: Our approach is agnostic to the particular choice of ranking model—it provides
a methodology to derive consequential rankings that are optimal under a ranking model. In our
experiments, we showcase our methodology for one well-known ranking model, the Plackett-Luce
(P-L) ranking model [24, 27], which is best described in terms of the orderings of the rankings. More
specifically, under the P-L model, at each time step t, the ranking y(t), with ordering ω(t), is sampled
from a distribution
pθ(y(t) |X(t)) =
n∏
k=1
fk(X(t)) =
n∏
k=1
exp
(
θTXωk(t)
)∑N
k′=k exp
(
θTXωk′ (t)
) (2)
4Unless stated otherwise, the notation pθ does not imply that θ is a parameter within a class of ranking models, but it just serves as a
placeholder to identify a specific ranking model.
5In our work, we consider probabilistic ranking models, which assign a probability to each ranking. It would be interesting to extend our
methodology to deterministic ranking models.
3
where θ is a given parameter. In the above, we can think of θTXωk(t) as a quality score associated to
the item ωk, which controls the probability that this item is ranked at the top—the higher the quality
score, the higher the probability that the item is ranked first. In practice, the quality score of the above
P-L ranking model may be computed using a complex nonlinear function [39], e.g., a neural network.
— User dynamics: Our approach only requires to be able to sampleX(t) from any arbitrary model
for the transition probability p(X(t) |X(t− 1),y(t− 1)), which may be estimated using historical
ranking and user data. Here, in contrast with the ranking model, the user dynamics are not something
that one can decide upon—they are given.
Consequential rankings. Let pθ0 be an existing ranking model that optimizes some hidden immedi-
ate utility and c(·) a cost to the welfare. Then, we construct a consequential ranking model pθ, which
optimally trades off the fidelity to the original ranking model and the cost to the long-term welfare,
by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
pθ
Eτ∼pθ [Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0))] , (3)
with
Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0)) = c(τ) + λ log pθ(τ |X(0),y(0))
pθ0(τ |X(0),y(0))
, (4)
where the expectation is taken over all the trajectories τ = {(X(t),y(t))}Tt=0 of feature matrices and
rankings of length T under the ranking model pθ and λ ≥ 0 is a given parameter which controls the
trade off between the fidelity to the original ranking model and the long-term cost to the welfare. In
Eq. 4, the first term penalizes trajectories that achieve a large cost to the welfare and the second term
penalizes ranking models whose induced trajectories differ more from those that the original model
would induce, where the terms associated to the user dynamics p(X(t) |X(t− 1),y(t− 1)) cancel.
Moreover, the choice of trajectory length T will depend on the definition of long-term—accounting
for longer-term consequences to the welfare will require larger trajectory lengths T .
Finally, note that our measure of fidelity has a natural interpretation in terms of the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence [20], which has been extensively used as a distance measure between probability
distributions, leading to the formulation of reinforcement learning as probabilistic inference [22, 18,
48]. More specifically, we can write the expectation of the second term as the KL divergence between
the original and the consequential ranking model, i.e., KL[pθ(· |X(0),y(0)) || pθ0(· |X(0),y(0))].
3 Building Consequential Rankings
In this section, we tackle the optimization problem defined by Eq. 3 from the perspective of reinforce-
ment learning and show that the optimal consequential ranking model can be expressed in terms of
the original ranking model.
We can first break the above problem into small recursive subproblems using Bellman’s principle
of optimality [2]. This readily follows from the fact that, under the representation introduced in
Section 2, the ranking model and the user dynamics are a Markov decision process (MDP). More
specifically, Bellman’s principle tells us that the optimal ranking model should satisfy the following
recursive equation, which is called the Bellman optimality equation:
Vt(X,y) = min
pθ
`(X,y) + E(X′,y′)∼pθ(X′,y′ |X,y) [Vt+1(X
′,y′)] (5)
with VT (X,y) = `(X,y). The function Vt(X,y) is called the value function and the function
`(X,y) is called immediate loss. Moreover, in our problem, it can be readily shown that the
immediate loss adopts the following form:
`(X,y) = c(X,y) + λE(X′,y′)∼pθ(X′,y′ |X,y)
[
log
pθ(X
′,y′ |X,y)
pθ0(X
′,y′ |X,y)
]
= c(X,y) + λKL(pθ(· , · |X,y) || pθ0(· , · |X,y)).
Within the loss function, the first term penalizes the immediate cost to the welfare and the second
term penalizes consequential ranking models whose induced transition probability differs from that
induced by the original ranking model.
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In general, Bellman optimality equations are difficult to solve. However, the structure of our problem
will help us find an analytical solution. Inspired by Todorov [38], we proceed as follows. Let
Zt(X,y) = exp(−Vt(X,y)). Then, we can rewrite the minimization in the RHS of Eq. 5 as
min
pθ
E(X′,y′)∼pθ(X′,y′ |X,y)
[
log
pθ(X
′,y′ |X,y)
pθ0(X
′,y′ |X,y)Zt+1(X ′,y′)
]
,
where we have dropped λ and c(X,y) because they do not depend on pθ. Then, we can use Eq. 1 to
factorize both transition probabilities in the numerator and the denominator within the logarithm and,
as a result, the terms p(X ′ |X,y) cancel and we obtain:
min
pθ
E(X′,y′)∼pθ(X′,y′ |X,y)
[
log
pθ(y
′ |X ′)
pθ0(y
′ |X ′)Zt+1(X ′,y′)
]
.
The above equation resembles a KL divergence, however, note that the fraction within the logarithm
does not depend on (X,y) and the denominator pθ0(y
′ |X ′)Zt+1(X ′,y′) is not normalized to one.
If we multiply and divide the fraction by the following normalization term:
G[Zt+1](X
′) = Ey′∼pθ0 (y′|X′)[Zt+1(X
′,y′)], (6)
we obtain:
min
pθ
− EX′∼p(X′ |X,y) [logG[Zt+1](X ′)] + E(X′,y′)∼pθ(X′,y′ |X,y)
[
log
pθ(y
′ |X ′)G[Zt+1](X ′)
pθ0(y
′ |X ′)Zt+1(X ′,y′)
]
.
In the above equation, note that the first term does not depend on pθ and the second term achieves
its global minimum of zero if the numerator and the denominator are equal. Thus, the optimal
consequential ranking model is just given by:
p∗θ(y |X) =
pθ0(y |X)Zt+1(X,y)
G[Zt+1](X)
. (7)
Finally, if we substitute back p∗θ into the Bellman equation, given by Eq. 5, and write it in terms of
Zt, we can also find the function Zt using the following recursive expression:
Zt(X,y) = exp
(−c(X,y) + λEX′∼p(X′ |X,y) [logG[Zt+1](X ′)]) ,
with ZT (X,y) = − log c(X,y). The above result has an important implication. It means that we
can use sampling methods to obtain (unbiased) samples from the optimal consequential ranking,
e.g., stratified sampling [9], as shown in Appendix B. However, in practice, these sampling methods
may be inefficient and have high variance if the original ranking model pθ0 produces rankings that
have very low probability under the optimal consequential ranking model. This will be specially
problematic in the presence of high-dimensional feature vectors due to the curse of dimensionality.
In the next section, we will present a practical method for approximating p∗θ(y |X), which iteratively
adapts a parameterized consequential ranking model using a stochastic gradient-based algorithm.
4 A Stochastic Gradient-Based Algorithm
In this section, our goal is to find a consequential ranking model pθ within a class of parameterized
ranking models P(Θ) that approximates well the optimal consequential ranking model p∗θ , given by
Eq. 7, that minimizes the objective function in Eq. 3, i.e., Eτ∼pθ [Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0))].
To this aim, we introduce a general gradient-based algorithm, which only requires the class of
parameterized ranking models P(Θ) to be differentiable. In particular, we resort to stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) [19], i.e., θ(j+1) = θ(j) + γj∇θ Eτ∼pθ [Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0))]|θ=θ(j) , where
γj > 0 is the learning rate at step j ∈ N. Here, it may seem challenging to compute a finite sample
estimate of the gradient of the objective function Eτ∼pθ [Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0))] since the derivative is
taken with respect to the parameters of the ranking model pθ, which we are trying to learn. However,
we can overcome this challenge using the log-derivative trick as in [43], which allows us to write the
gradient as:
∇θEτ∼pθ [Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0))] = Eτ∼pθ [(Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0)) + λ)∇θ log pθ(τ |X(0),y(0))] ,
(8)
5
Algorithm 1 It trains a parameterized consequential ranking model.
Require: Cost to welfare c(·), parameter λ, original ranking model pθ0 , (X(0),y(0)), # of iterations M , mini
batch size B, and learning rate γ.
1: θ(0) ← INITIALIZERANKINGMODEL()
2: for j = 1, . . . ,M do . iterations
3: D ← MINIBATCH(pθ, B) . sample mini batch
4: ∇ ← 0
5: for τ (i) ∈ D do
6: S ← c(τ (i)) + λ log pθ(j) (τ
(i) |X(0),y(0))
pθ0 (τ
(i) |X(0),y(0))
7: ∇ ← ∇+ (S + λ)∇θ log pθ(j)(τ (i) |X(0),y(0))
8: θ(j+1) ← θ(j) + γ ∇
B
9: return θ(M)
where∇θ log pθ(τ |X(0),y(0)) is often referred as the score function [16]. The overall procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 1, where MINIBATCH(pθ, B) samples a minibatch of size B from pθ(τ)
and INITIALIZERANKINGMODEL() initializes the parameters of the ranking model.
Remarks. Note that, to compute an empirical estimate of the gradient in Eq. 8, we only need to be
able to sample from the user dynamics p(X(t) |X(t− 1),y(t− 1)), since the explicit dependence
cancels out within Sθ(τ |X(0),y(0)), as pointed out in Section 2. Moreover, depending on the
choice of parameterized family of ranking models, one may be able to compute the score functions
analytically. In our experiments, the class of Plackett-Luce (P-L) ranking models allows for that, i.e.,
∇θ log pθ(τ |X(0),y(0)) =
T∑
t=1
n∑
k=1
(
θT −∇θ log
n∑
k′=k
exp(θTXωk′(t))
)
,
where the second term within the logarithm in the last equation is the derivative of the log-sum-exp
function, whose analytical expression can be found elsewhere. Finally, if we think of the para-
meterized ranking model pθ as a policy, our algorithm resembles policy gradient algorithms used in
the reinforcement learning literature [36]. This connection opens up the possibility of using variance
reduction techniques used in policy gradient to improve the empirical estimation of the gradient [47].
5 Experiments on synthetic data
In this section, our goal is compare the performance of ranking models that maximize an immediate
measure of utility against consequential rankings in a problem setting with known user dynamics
satisfying the Markov property.
Experimental setup. Each trajectory has length T = 30 and, at each time step t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, the
ranking model receives a set of n = 10 posts I(t) and ranks them. Given a set of items I(t) and a
ranking y(t), we assume that the set of items I(t+ 1) is just a copy of the set of items I(t) where the
d ∼ Poisson(1) posts at the bottom of the ranking y(t) are replaced by new posts. Each post i has
two featuresXi(t) = [pi, ai(t)], where pi is the (static) probability that the post is misinformation
and ai(t) is the (dynamic) rate of shares at time t, initialized with ai(0) = 0. There are high risk posts
(pi = 0.6) and low risk posts (pi = 0.1) and a post is either high risk or low risk uniformly at random.
Thus, whether the actual post is misinformation or not is a latent variable mi ∼ Bernouilli(pi), which
is unobserved by the ranking model. The instantaneous rate of shares for each item i is given by
ai(t + 1) = exp(−2(t− si)) (ai(t) + αi + 0.1yi(t)), where si is the time when the post was first
ranked by the ranking model, αi is the virality, and a post is either viral (αi = 10) or non viral
(αi = 0.1) uniformly at random. Here, note that rate of shares of an item increases if the item is
ranked at the top, as observed in previous empirical studies.
The original ranking model pθ0 aims to promote viral posts on the top K = 3 positions of the ranking
at each time t, i.e., u(t) =
∑K=3
k=1 aωk(t)(t), where ω(t) is the ordering of the ranking y(t). To this
aim, it uses a Plackett-Luce (P-L) model, given by Eq. 2, with θ ∈ [0, 1]. The consequential ranking
models pθ aim to trade off fidelity to the original model and the long-term presence of misinformation
on the top K = 3 positions of the rankings, i.e., c(τ) = 1T
∑T
t=1
∑K=3
k=1 pωk(t). Here, we consider
two consequential rankings models: (i) an optimal consequential ranking model p∗θ , which provides
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Figure 1: Performance of the original ranking model (1/λ→ 0) and the optimal consequential ranking
model (1/λ > 0) in synthetic data. Panels (a) and (b) show that, as 1/λ increases, the consequential
ranking model is able to reduce the (true) cost to welfare without significantly decreasing the
immediate utility. Panel (c) shows that, as 1/λ increases, the fraction of misinformation for viral
posts on the top 3 positions is lower than the fraction of misinformation for non viral posts.
rankings by applying weighted sampling on the rankings provided by the original ranking model pθ0 ;
and, (ii) a Plackett-Luce (P-L) consequential ranking model pθ, which is learned using Algorithm 1
with M = 400 iterations and B = 50 as batch size. Moreover, we experiment with different values
of the parameter λ, which controls the trade off between fidelity to the original model and cost to the
welfare and, for each experiment, we perform 200 repetitions.
Quality of the rankings. We first compare the original ranking model pθ0 and the optimal conse-
quential ranking model p∗θ in terms of three quality metrics: (i) the immediate utility u(t); (ii) the cost
to welfare c(τ); and, (iii) the true cost to welfare c∗(τ), defined as c∗(τ) = 1T
∑T
t=1
∑K=3
k=1 mωk(t).
Figure 1(a-b) summarizes the results, where note that the original ranking model pθ0 is just the
optimal consequential ranking model with 1/λ → 0. The results show that: (i) the consequential
ranking model achieves lower (true) cost to welfare than the original ranking model; and, (ii) as
1/λ increases, the consequential ranking model is able to reduce the (true) cost to welfare without
significantly decreasing the immediate utility. Next, we investigate whether the optimal consequential
ranking model treats viral and non-viral posts differently. Intuitively, the ranking model should be
more willing to change the rank of high risk viral posts than that of high risk non viral posts. To
confirm this intuition, we compute the fraction of estimated and true misinformation, η(τ) and η∗(τ),
in the top K = 3 positions of the rankings over time for both viral (α = 10) and non viral (α = 0.1)
posts. Figure 1(c) summarizes the results, which show that, as we increase 1/λ, the fraction of
misinformation for viral posts on the top 3 positions is lower than the fraction of misinformation for
non viral posts. Appendix C provides an in-depth comparison between optimal and P-L consequential
ranking models.
6 Experiments on real data
In this section, we compare the performance of ranking models that maximize an immediate measure
of utility and parameterized consequential rankings models using data from Reddit, a popular social
news aggregation platform6. Before we proceed further, we would like to acknowledge that:
(i) Since we do not have access to the ranking algorithm used by Reddit (or any other social media
platform), our experiments are a proof of concept, which demonstrate the practical potential of
our methodology on real data using a simple P-L ranking model. Evaluating the efficacy of our
methodology across a wide range of deployed ranking algorithms is left as future work.
(ii) Our experiments use observational data, i.e., they are open loop. As a result, the rankings only
influence the immediate utility and the cost of welfare but not the user dynamics. However, our
evaluation is likely to be conservative—consequential rankings may achieve a greater reduction
of the cost to welfare in an interventional experiment. For example, in the context of uncivil
behavior, there is empirical evidence that users are more likely to post uncivil comments if
they are exposed to uncivil comments before [6, 26]. Therefore, penalizing the rank of uncivil
comments over time may prevent other users from engaging into uncivil behavior.
Dataset description and experimental setup. We used a publicly available Reddit dataset7, which
contains (nearly) all publicly available comments to link submissions posted by Reddit users from
6Due to the size of the dataset, we were unable to run the weighted sampling procedure needed to implement optimal consequential
rankings models.
7https://archive.org/details/2015_reddit_comments_corpus.
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Figure 2: Performance of the original ranking model (1/λ → 0) and the optimal consequential
ranking model (1/λ > 0) in real Reddit data in terms of average immediate utility u(τ) and cost
to the welfare c(τ). Lines are averages and shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals over all
submissions in the test set.
October 2007 to May 2015. In our experiments, we focused on the links submissions to the subreddit
Politics and selected the set of submissions with more than 10 and less than 60 comments. After
these preprocessing steps, our dataset comprised 3,173 submissions and 68,016 comments.
In a first set of experiments, we focus on the civility of the comments in each submission, as measured
by an uncivility score φ. In a second set of experiments, we focus on the misinformation spread by
the comments of each submission, as measured by an unreliability score γ. Appendix D contains
more details on the definition and estimation of both scores. In both sets of experiments, we use
42,267 comments from 1,973 submissions as training set for learning the parameterized consequential
ranking models and 25,749 comments from 1,200 submissions as test set for evaluation.
Each submission corresponds to one trajectory whose length T is just the number of comments in the
submission, i.e., each time step corresponds to the time at which a new comment was created. Then,
at each time step t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, the ranking model ranks the latest set of n = 10 comments I(t).
Moreover, each comment i has three featuresXi(t) = [τi, φi, γi], where τi is the time (in seconds)
elapsed since the first comment was posted, φi is the uncivility score and γi is the unreliability
score At each time t, the original ranking model pθ0 aims to promote the most recent comment
to the top of the ranking, i.e., its immediate utility u(t) is defined as u(t) = τω1(t), where ω1(t)
is the item at the top of the rank y(t). To this aim, it uses a Plackett-Luce (P-L) model, given
by Eq. 2, with θ = [1.25 · 10−4, 0, 0]. For the first set of experiments, the consequential ranking
models pθ aim to trade off fidelity to the original ranking model and the civility of the comments
on the top K = 6 positions of the rankings, i.e., c(τ) = 1T
∑T
t=1
∑K=6
k=1 φωk(t). In a second set of
experiments, the consequential ranking models pθ aim to trade off fidelity to the original ranking
model and the misinformation in the comments on the top K = 6 positions of the rankings, i.e.,
c(τ) = 1T
∑T
t=1
∑K=6
k=1 γωk(t). In both cases, the consequential ranking models are Plackett-Luce
(P-L) models, which we learned using Algorithm 1 with M = 20 iterations and B = 100 as batch
size, and experiment with λ = [0.0, 1.0, 2.0, ..., 10.0].
Quality of the rankings. We first compare the original ranking model pθ0 and the consequential
P-L ranking models pθ using the average immediate utility and the cost to welfare. Here, note
that, in the first set of experiments, the cost to welfare measures the degree of uncivility of the top
ranking positions while, in the second set of experiments, it measures the amount of misinformation.
Figure 2 summarizes the results, where note that the original ranking model pθ0 is just the optimal
consequential ranking model with 1/λ → 0. The results show that the consequential P-L ranking
models are able to reduce the cost to the welfare up to 30% at a minimum cost in terms of immediate
utility—they are able to reduce the degree of uncivility and the amount of misinformation at the top
ranking positions without significant changes to the original reverse chronological ranking.
7 Conclusions
We have initiated the design of (parameterized) consequential ranking models that optimally trade off
between the fidelity to ranking models optimizing for immediate utility and the long-term welfare.
Our work opens up many interesting avenues for future work. For example, we have considered
probabilistic ranking models and a fidelity measure based on KL divergence. A natural next step is
to augment our methodology to allow for deterministic ranking models and consider other fidelity
measures between rankings. It would be very interesting to apply our framework to more sophisticated
ranking models. Moreover, we have assumed that the models that optimize for immediate utility
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are optimal. However, they may be suboptimal in terms of the sum of immediate utility over time
since it is unclear that current ranking models are designed to account for the consequences that their
proposed rankings have on the feature matrices. It would be very interesting to account for this in
future work. It would also be interesting to experiment with settings in which the cost to welfare
cannot be factorized into items, e.g., information diversity. Finally, we have evaluated our algorithm
using observational real data, however, it would be very revealing to perform an evaluation based on
interventional experiments.
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A Graphical representation of rankings and user dynamics
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Figure 3: Our joint representation of rankings and user dynamics using Markov decision processes
(MDPs). The ranking model pθ(y(t) |X(t)) provides a ranking y(t) for a set of items on the basis of
the feature matrixX(t) of the items and both the feature matrix and the provided ranking result in a
cost to welfare c(X(t),y(t)). The distribution of user dynamics p(X(t+1) |X(t),y(t)) determines
the feature matrixX(t+ 1) on the basis of the previous feature matrixX(t) and ranking y(t).
B Algorithm for sampling from optimal consequential ranking
Algorithm 2 shows the stratified sampling [9] method for obtaining samples from optimal conse-
quential ranking. Within the algorithm, SAMPLE(pθ0 , κ) samples κ trajectories from pθ0(τ) and
STRATIFIEDSAMPLER(D′,W ) generates |D′| samples weighted by W using stratified sampling.
Algorithm 2 It samples from an optimal consequential ranking model given pθ0 .
Require: Cost to welfare c(·), parameter λ, original ranking model pθ0 , (X(0),y(0)), # of samples B, # of
samples κ to compute G[ZT ].
1: D ← SAMPLE(pθ0 , κ) . samples for estimating G[ZT ].
2: G[ZT ]← 0
3: for c(τi) ∈ D do
4: G[ZT ]← G[ZT ] + exp
(−λ−1c(τi))/κ
5: D′ ← SAMPLE(pθ0 , B) . unweighted samples.
6: W ← [] . array of weights.
7: for c(τi) ∈ D′ do
8: W [i]← exp (−λ−1c(τi))/κ/G[ZT ]
9: W ←W/SUM(W )
10: return STRATIFIEDSAMPLER(D′,W )
C Additional experiments on synthetic data
First, we compare the performance of the optimal consequential ranking model computed via weighted
sampling and the P-L ranking model learned using Algorithm 1 using the same quality metrics as in
the previous section. Figure 4(a-b) summarizes the results. We observe that both the optimal and
P-L consequential ranking models achieve similar values of immediate utility over time. However,
the optimal model has a competitive advantage in terms of cost to the welfare, which becomes more
pointed as 1/λ grows. These findings suggest that, the larger the value of 1/λ, the more difficult is to
learn a P-L model that approximates effectively the optimal model.
Next, we compare the scalability of both models in terms of the number of samples needed per ranking.
Figure 4(c) summarizes the results, which shows that, as 1/λ grows, it becomes computationally
prohibitive to generate optimal consequential rankings using weighted sampling due to the growing
difference between p∗θ and pθ0 . This questions the practicality of weighted sampling to generate
optimal consequential rankings.
D Uncivility and unreliability scores
To estimate the uncivility score φ for each comment, we apply sentiment analysis on the text of
the comments using the software package Pattern8 and, for each comment, obtain two quantities:
8https://www.clips.uantwerpen.be/pages/pattern-en
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Figure 4: Performance and scalability of the optimal consequential ranking model and the P-L conse-
quential ranking model learned using Algorithm 1. Panels (a-b) show that the optimal consequential
ranking model achieves a better trade off between immediate utility and cost to the welfare than the
P-L consequential ranking model. However, Panel (c) shows that the weighted sampling the optimal
model uses to generate rankings quickly become computationally prohibitive in terms of # samples
needed per ranking as 1/λ increases and the difference between the original ranking model and the
optimal consequential ranking model increases.
mood and polarity. The mood of a comment can take one of the following four values: indicative,
imperative, conditional and subjunctive. The polarity of a comment is a real number in [−1, 1],
where lower (higher) values indicate more negative (positive) words in the text. Then, we define the
uncivility score φ of a comment as the absolute value of the polarity of the comment if the polarity is
negative and the mood of the comment is indicative or imperative and zero otherwise
We estimate the unreliability score γ for each comment by estimating the average unreliability score
of the domains that appeared in each of them, as estimated by aggregating publicly available data from
Politifact and Snopes9. More specifically, our combined dataset contains fact checking information
for 17,804 unique urls from 4,540 unique domains. For each url, it assigns a label that indicates
the reliability of its content. We used these labels to assign a numerical unreliability score for each
url. More specifically, if the url is labeled as “false”, “pants-fire”, “mfalse” or “legend”, we set
the unreliability score to 1. If the url is labeled as “true”, “mtrue” or “mostly-true”, then we set
the unreliability score to −1. And, if the url is labeled using some other label value, we set the
unreliability score to 0. We computed an unreliability score for each domain, which measures its
level of (un)trustworthiness, by taking the average of the unreliability scores of individual urls from
the domain. Then, we define the unreliability score γ of a comment as the average unreliability score
of the domain(s) of the link(s) used in the comment if the average is negative and zero otherwise.
Here, also note that, if a comment does not contain any links or the domain(s) of the link(s) does not
appear in our dataset, we set the unreliability score for that comment to 0.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a few examples of comments with a high uncivility score and domains with a
high unreliability score.
Comment Uncivility (φ)
If you once tell a lie, the truth is ever after 0.0
your enemy.
I dream of a world where your bigoted stupid 0.1
ideas don’t have the popular shield of faith.
Shut the f**k up and die already you POS 0.4
warmongering profiteer.
Crap? Or pap. Take your pick. 0.8
i blame the evil KOCH BROTHERS! 1.0
Table 1: Examples of sentences with different levels of uncivility, as estimated by the feature φ.
Comments with higher levels of uncivility typically correspond to those that use foul language.
9https://www.kaggle.com/arminehn/rumor-citation/version/3
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Url Misinformation (γ)
aids.gov 0.0
pbs.org 0.26
breitbart.com 0.56
lifeisajoke.com 1.0
Table 2: Examples of domains that spread different amounts of misinformation, as estimated by the
feature γ.
E Additional experiments on real data
In the experiments on real data in the main paper, we have assumed that the original ranking model
pθ0 maximizes immediate utility. Moreover, we have taken for granted that there is a negative
correlation between the immediate utility achieved by the consequential ranking model and the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between its induced probability pθ(τ) and the probability pθ0(τ)
induced by the original ranking model. However, in practice, it may happen that the original ranking
model is not optimal in terms of immediate utility maximization. This may be specially the case
if the original ranking model greedily maximizes immediate utility and does not take into account
how their proposed rankings change the user dynamics. Figure 5 demonstrates that, in our first set
of experiments, there is indeed a negative correlation between the immediate utility and the KL
divergence, however, in our second set of experiments, there is a positive correlation. This suggests
that the original ranking model in the second set of experiments is suboptimal.
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Figure 5: Average immediate utility E[u(τ)] achieved by the consequential ranking model vs the
average Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence E[KL(pθ || pθ0)] between its induced probability pθ(τ)
and the probability pθ0(τ) induced by the original ranking model.
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